4.
39
12.
This leads to a consideration of the danger to
Macao from Japanese attack to which your telegram no doubt
had special reference. With hostilities and something like
a blockade at our doors it would be a rash man who would
speculate on Japan's present aims in South China, but it is
difficult to believe that Macao with its shallow water and
its general strategic disadvantages would be a likely objective.
If a forcible occupation in despite of treaties is contemplated,
some island or other deep water place in South China would
surely be more worth while strategically, quite apart from
the vital fact that the integrity of China would seem to be
a much less dangerous stake to hazard than the integrity of
a European Colony.
13. The alternative of a full-dress war between Japan and
Portugal with all of the Portuguese possessions in Asia at stake
is not for me to discuss. But from every conceivable point of
view it is difficult to see how this issue could be seriously
affected by a few additional fortifications at Macao which
could have no possible target to seaward greater than a
shallow-draft gunboat.
14.
I have apologized for the "political" character of
this despatch and I must now add an apology for its prolixity.
On the eve of handing over the administration I can at least
promise that neither offence will be repeated.
15.
I make no apology, however, for suggesting that
the commercial relations between Hong Kong and Macao deserve
to be more intimate than in the past. This was Dr. Barbosa's
constant plea and I suggest that it deserves consideration
quite apart from irredentism and Japanese "bogeys" and politics
generally. Much has been made in the past of Macao's
budgetary dependence on gambling and opium. But there is a
considerable legitimate trade, there is a good road between
Macao and the important Shek-ki district and there is a vast
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